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Abstract 
After 10 years of a fixed exchange rate against the euro and a deepening integration 
with the European Union (EU), the authorities of Cape Verde maintain a strong 
commitment to nominal stability and are now considering the official euroization of the 
country. 
Compared to the current pegging, euroization could be costly if the economic conditions 
of Cape Verde were to require control over the interest rates and the exchange rate. 
Given the strong economic and financial integration between Cape Verde and Europe, 
and the fact that Cape Verde records inflation rates at levels that are similar to those of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), the relevant issue is whether the European 
Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy fits the needs of Cape Verde. In order to answer 
this question, we empirically assess the synchronization between the business cycle of 
Cape Verde and the business cycle of the EMU. For that purpose, we compute output 
gaps and then use conventional correlation measures as well as other indicators recently 
suggested in the literature. Replicating the methodology for each of the current 27 EU 
members, our results show that Cape Verde ranks better than several EU countries and 
even better than some EMU countries. We thus argue that there is a strong case for the 
euroization of Cape Verde. Euroization would secure the benefits already attained with 
the pegging to the euro and would warrant additional benefits, most likely with no 
relevant costs stemming from inappropriate ECB monetary policies. 
 
Keywords: Africa, Cape Verde, European Monetary Union, Euroization, Business 
Cycles. 
JEL classification: E32, E58, F44. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the exchange agreement established between Cape Verde and Portugal 
(Acordo de Cooperação Cambial, ACC), in April 1998 the Cape-verdean escudo (CVE) 
became anchored to the Portuguese escudo (PTE). With the adoption of the euro by 
Portugal, the ACC has been recognized by the European authorities and the CVE was 
officially anchored to the euro.1 Since 1 January 1999 the exchange rate has been 
pegged at 110.265 CVE per euro. 
 
The adoption of this conventional peg had two main purposes. On one hand, it was 
intended to further stimulate trade, investment and the overall economic and financial 
relations with Europe. On the other hand, it was intended to ensure an environment of 
nominal stability and the resulting macroeconomic discipline which, jointly with an 
emphasis on free markets and private initiative, would promote sustained growth. In 
fact, pegging to the euro would imply the loss of monetary autonomy by Cape Verde in 
favour of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy. As the ECB is credibly 
committed to price stability, shadowing the policy of the anchor would warrant low 
inflation rates.2 The priority to price stability has been later on stated in Law, at the 
2002 revision of the statutes of the central bank of Cape Verde (BCV). 
 
Following the decision to peg, the choice of the euro as the reference currency was 
obvious. On one hand, economic and financial relations between Cape Verde and 
Portugal, as well as Europe, were already profound as a result of historical and cultural 
ties – including a common language – and even some geographical proximity. On the 
other hand, adopting the euro was simply a continuation of a strategy clearly oriented to 
price stability. In fact, as documented by Honohan and Lane (1999), Cape Verde was 
one of the few non European countries that have tracked the German mark (DEM) for 
many years, until the replacement of the DEM by the euro. Given that by the time the 
ACC agreement was signed it was clear that Portugal was about to join the European 
                                                 
1
 The decision was taken by the European Council, following a recommendation of the European Central 
Bank. See European Council (1998) and ECB (1999). 
2
 As is well known, anchoring the domestic currency to that of a large country with a tradition of low 
inflation is one of the possible strategies for achieving price stability. See, for example, Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1988). 
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Monetary Union (EMU), the agreement can thus be interpreted as instrumental for Cape 
Verde to become institutionally linked to the euro. 
 
At this point, it should also be noted that Cape Verde has always preferred to take 
decisions on exchange rate matters in an independent way. For example, pegging to the 
euro could have been indirectly done by joining the Western African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), as Guinea Bissau did in 1997.3 However, instead of doing 
it via the regional CFA franc, Cape Verde decided to take a short cut to the euro. Also, 
in 1999, Cape Verde declined to participate in the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ), a project that would eventually lead to a single currency for the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Cape Verde is a member. 
 
The authorities of Cape Verde are presently considering deepening the current link of 
the CVE to the euro, and official euroization of Cape Verde is one of the alternatives 
under debate. This intention has been voiced, among others, by the prime-minister.4 The 
proposal of a full de jure liberalization of the international capital movements, prior to 
euroization, has also been raised. Clearly, these steps would mean a strengthened 
renewal of the two objectives set forth in 1998. 
 
The choice faced by Cape-verdean authorities is between a fixed or a super-fixed 
exchange rate regime (see LeBaron and McCulloch, 2000). In the case where the latter 
is chosen and Cape Verde actually liberalizes the capital account, then euroization is the 
recommended option. In fact, as noted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and shown by 
several episodes in the last two decades, conventional fixed exchange rate regimes 
combined with free capital flows are prone to speculative attacks. Neither sound 
fundamentals nor foreign exchange credit lines seem to effectively prevent speculation. 
Even harder fixed exchange rate regimes, such as currency boards, are vulnerable to 
                                                 
 As suggested elsewhere in the literature, African countries may achieve the objective of nominal 
stability through a monetary union, even if lacking individual credibility (e.g., Buigut and Valev, 2009). 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that a common African currency should be linked to an external 
anchor, namely the euro (e.g., Honohan and Lane, 2001). In practice, this is the case with the WAEMU.
4
 See, inter alia, the speech given at the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the ACC agreement 
between Cape Verde and Portugal, Neves (2008). 
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speculative attacks, as shown by the experiences of Hong Kong and Argentina (see Berg 
and Borensztein, 2000 and Irwin, 2004). 
 
Truly, the elimination of speculative attacks and the other benefits of euroization come 
at some costs. The main cost is the irreversible loss of two policy instruments 
traditionally used for macroeconomic management, namely the exchange rate and the 
interest rate. 
 
In theory, the exchange rate may be a useful instrument for management of external 
demand. For instance, in case of an external deficit, a depreciation of the exchange rate 
may spur exports and replace imports by domestic production. While it is true that 
euroization removes this possibility, it should be noted that given the structural 
characteristics of Cape Verde (a small economy highly dependent on imports of most 
final and intermediate goods, including energy), the adjustment of external demand via 
the exchange rate is an illusion. In fact, any depreciation with the purpose of increasing 
net exports would hardly have any impact. Increasing the price of imports (for instance, 
of food) does not improve Cape Verde’s competitiveness in the production of such 
goods. Production is structurally limited by a number of natural constraints (such as 
climate, aridity and relief), which the exchange rate can not modify. Therefore, an 
exchange rate depreciation would not reduce the volume of imports but simply increase 
the cost of living. Analogously, an exchange rate depreciation would not effectively 
promote exports, as the very high pass-through from import prices to domestic prices 
would rapidly increase wages as well as other input costs. This would increase the price 
of exports in CVE without significantly changing the prices in foreign currency. In 
short, the loss of exchange rate management would not be a structural cost for Cape 
Verde. 
 
In principle, another potential cost of euroization is the loss of monetary policy for anti-
cyclical purposes, as the ECB policy applies. To be sure, the absence of realignments of 
the CVE parity during the last ten years has required the monetary policy of the BCV 
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not to diverge markedly from that of the ECB.5 Hence, the cost of losing monetary 
autonomy does not seem to be, either, any novelty regarding the recent experience. This 
statement does not imply that the monetary policy of the BCV (and of the ECB) has 
been adequate to smooth the business cycle of Cape Verde. Adequacy can, however, be 
checked by studying the synchronization between the business cycles of Cape Verde 
and those of the EMU. 
 
Alesina and Barro (2002) have shown that the type of country that has more to gain 
from giving up its own currency is (i) a small open economy, trading heavily with the 
issuer of the currency to be adopted, (ii) with a history of high inflation, and (iii) with a 
business cycle highly correlated with the cycle of the currency issuer. This framework 
has motivated empirical studies of a number of authors, focusing on several countries, 
and with different purposes. For instance, Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) used 
those three criteria in order to identify, on the basis of historical data, three possible 
currency areas, namely an euro area, a dollar area and a yen area. In the same vein, 
Furceri and Karras (2006) checked the behaviour of inflation and the synchronization of 
cycles of the new European Union (EU) members, in order to find out which countries 
would benefit from joining EMU. These studies assume that countries with higher 
inflation rates are the ones that gain the most from adopting a currency issued by a 
foreign independent central bank (such as the ECB), provided their business cycles are 
strongly synchronized with that of the issuer. In fact, those countries would obtain the 
benefit of disinflation a la Barro and Gordon (1983), without incurring the costs of a 
cyclically misaligned monetary policy. 
 
In the next section we provide a brief overview of the economy of Cape Verde. The data 
there presented show that, through the exchange-rate-pegging strategy, Cape Verde has 
already achieved low levels of inflation. Thus, the argument that euroization would 
contribute to disinflation is not relevant in the case of Cape Verde. However, on top of 
other benefits, euroization would secure the gains achieved as regards price stability. 
Moreover, one must bear in mind that if euroization is to be formally agreed with the 
EU, the fulfilment of the criterion of low inflation (as stated in the EU Treaty for EMU 
                                                 
5
 The prevalence of some foreign exchange restrictions may have allowed for some independence of the 
BCV’s monetary policy. 
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membership) will be required beforehand. The next section also documents the high 
degree of openness of the Cape-verdean economy, as well as its strong trade, investment 
and financial links to Europe. 
 
Hence, the empirical focus of this paper is on the third criterion referred by Alesina and 
Barro (2002), i.e. the degree of synchronization of business cycles. Assessing the 
synchronization between the business cycle of Cape Verde and that of the EMU over 
the last ten years allows for an ex-post inference of whether the ECB monetary policy – 
closely followed by the BCV – has been adequate for demand management of the Cape-
verdean economy. A high degree of synchronization means that the monetary policy 
designed by the ECB for the whole EMU has met the needs of Cape Verde. Looking 
forward, in the case where the degree of synchronization is indeed large, one may ex-
ante conclude that official replacement of the CVE by the euro, and the corresponding 
loss of an independent interest rate, will not imply relevant macroeconomic costs for 
Cape Verde. 
 
Actually, an ex-ante high synchronization of business cycles may not be a necessary 
condition for euroization. There is a vast body of literature – known under the heading 
of “endogeneity of optimum currency areas” – emphasizing that the adoption of a 
common currency sets in motion a virtuous engine that increases cyclical co-
movements.6 Still, given the uncertainty about the mechanisms that may lead to 
endogenous synchronization of cycles, it is advisable to be prudent. And being prudent 
is, for our purpose, to detect a history of evident similarity of business cycles ahead of 
euroization. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present a brief overview 
of the Cape-verdean economy. In section 3 we empirically assess the degree of 
synchronization between the business cycle of Cape Verde and the EMU cycle. To 
                                                 
6
 The hypothesis of optimum-currency-area endogeneity was first suggested by Frankel and Rose (1997, 
1998). Originally, the reasoning was that sharing a common currency would increase trade integration 
and that trade integration would, in turn, increase synchronization of business cycles. The endogeneity 
arising through the trade channel is the most discussed in the literature, very much due to the huge effect 
of common currencies on trade found by Rose (2000). However, as surveyed by De Grauwe and Mongelli 
(2005), other channels beyond trade may also trigger endogeneity. 
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further interpret the results for Cape Verde, we replicate the assessment for each of the 
27 EU countries. Some final remarks and conclusions are presented in section 4. 
 
2. A brief overview of the economy of Cape Verde: A tale of a successful peg to the 
euro 
 
In this section we briefly describe the economy of Cape Verde and review how the fixed 
exchange rate regime between the CVE and the euro has been managed for the last ten 
years.7 In spite of the scarcity of natural resources, the high protection of key markets 
and a strong reliance upon tourism-based activities, Cape Verde has been deepening its 
economic and financial integration with Europe and has already come across some of 
the underlying costs of relinquishing the control over the national currency.  
 
Cape Verde was a Portuguese colony that became independent in 1975. Spread out over 
10 islands, Cape Verde is located 500 kms West of Senegal and 1300 kms South of the 
Canary Islands, which is the closest region belonging to the EMU. Cape Verde is a very 
small economy with approximately 530 thousand people (roughly 0.17 per cent of the 
EMU’s) and with a gross domestic product (GDP) that amounts to just 0.01 per cent of 
the euro area GDP. 
 
Cape Verde has a stable democracy and, unlike many African countries, has not been 
subject to episodes of civil unrest. According to the 2008 Corruption Perception Index 
of Transparency International, Cape Verde ranks 47th among the 180 observed 
countries. This makes Cape Verde one of the best performers among African countries, 
also performing better than 9 EU countries (Slovakia, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria). 
 
The average of real GDP growth rates in the last fifteen years was close to 8 per cent, 
i.e. double that of the corresponding figure for the Sub-Saharan Africa. This path has 
                                                 
7
 Hereafter, and throughout this section, we make use of information and data released by public sources, 
namely the central bank of Cape Verde, the International Monetary Fund, the Statistical Offices of Cape 
Verde and Portugal and the Portuguese Ministry of Finance. Raw and treated data used in the text are 
available upon request. 
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strongly contributed to the current International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification of 
Cape Verde among the Sub-Sahara African countries of middle income, a group that 
also includes Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Southern Africa and 
Swaziland. Since the beginning of 2008, the United Nations also ranks Cape Verde as a 
middle income country.  
 
Cape Verde is a highly open economy. This is shown in Table 1, which displays the 
degree of openness, as measured by the sum of imports and exports of goods and 
services, divided by twice the GDP. For comparative purposes, the table also presents 
figures for all EU countries, both EMU and non-EMU. The figures reported in column I 
measure only relative exports to and imports from the euro area, providing the degree of 
openness relative to the EMU. The group of EMU countries consists of the eleven 
founding members, plus Greece that joined in 2001 (EMU12). Column II reports the 
total degree of openness (World), i.e., total exports and imports of each country relative 
to GDP. Column III shows, for each country, the proportion of trade with EMU12 in 
total trade.8 
                                                 
8
 Most of the figures reported in Table 1 refer to 2004-2007. This is the only period for which Eurostat 
reports data on trade in services between the EMU and most of the EU members. We include data on 
trade in services because data on foreign trade in tourism is critical for any study of the economy of Cape 
Verde. 
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Table 1. Degree of integration as measured by trade in goods and services, 2004-07(1) 
Ratio of openness (%) (III) = (I)/(II) Country EMU12 (I) World (II) (%) Ranking 
Cape Verde 27.9 53.0 52.7 10 
EMU countries: 
Austria (2) 
 
29.8 
 
53.2 
 
55.9 
 
5 
Belgium (2) 56.8 84.9 67.5 2 
Cyprus (5) 24.8 50.1 49.4 15 
Finland (2) 13.8 40.5 34.2 26 
France (2) 14.2 26.7 53.0 9 
Germany (2)  17.0 40.1 42.5 21 
Greece (3) 10.3 27.4 37.6 25 
Ireland (2) 28.5 75.1 38.0 24 
Italy (2) 12.1 27.1 44.9 18 
Luxembourg (2) 94.0 152.4 61.9 3 
Malta (5) 42.2 85.1 49.5 14 
Netherlands (2) 35.6 66.9 54.2 6 
Portugal (2) 23.3 34.2 68.2 1 
Slovakia (6) 35.6 81.9 43.5 19 
Slovenia (4) 36.8 64.7 57.0 4 
Spain (2) 15.6 28.9 53.5 7 
Non-EMU countries: 
Denmark (7) 
 
18.3 
 
47.8 
 
38.3 
 
23 
Estonia (7) 35.2 81.7 43.2 20 
Latvia (7) 16.3 53.7 30.3 27 
Lithuania (7) 17.0 60.5 28.1 28 
Bulgaria (8) 30.7 69.9 45.0 17 
Czech Republic (9) 38.9 73.3 53.0 8 
Romania (9) 19.7 38.3 52.2 11 
Hungary (10) 37.3 72.2 51.8 12 
Poland (10) 20.7 39.9 51.8 13 
Sweden (10) 18.9 45.8 41.3 22 
United Kingdom (10) 13.1 28.2 46.4 16 
Notes: (1) Period coverage: the data is an average for the period 2004-07, except for Belgium, Bulgaria 
and Netherlands (average 2004-06) and for Romania and Spain (average 2005-07) in columns (I) 
and (III); (2) EMU founding country (1999); (3) EMU country since 2001; (4) EMU country 
since 2007; (5) EMU country since 2008; (6) EMU country since 2009; (7) Countries in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) since 1999, 2004, 2005 and 2005, respectively. Denmark 
is committed to a +/-2.25% band; Estonia has a unilateral commitment to a currency board based 
on the euro since 1999 and Lithuania since February 2002; Latvia has a unilateral commitment 
to an exchange rate band of +/-1%; (8) Euro-based currency board; (9) Managed float based on 
the euro; (10) Independent floating. 
Sources: - European countries: Eurostat, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/balance_of_payments/data/database, 
(accessed in March 2009). 
- Cape Verde: International Financial Statistics (IMF), BCV (http://www.bcv.cv/) and Eurostat, 
available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database 
(accessed in March 2009). 
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Table 1 shows that Cape Verde is more open than many EU countries (53 per cent), that 
it trades more with the EMU12 than many EU countries do (27.9 per cent), and that, 
among the 28 countries considered, Cape Verde has the 10th highest degree of 
concentration of trade with the EMU12 (52.7 per cent). Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands 
and France are the most representative trading partners as they account for roughly 80 
per cent of the Cape-verdean merchandise trade. 
 
Due to a high dependence from abroad on energy, equipment and food, Cape Verde has 
had a chronic deficit in its merchandise trade balance. On average, in the last ten years, 
the deficit amounted to nearly 40 per cent of GDP. 
 
The deficit in merchandise trade has been partially financed by tourism services, which 
have boomed from 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1999 to around 20 per cent of GDP in recent 
years. Tourism currently accounts for almost 50 per cent of the exports of Cape Verde 
and is highly concentrated in the EU, particularly in some EMU countries. In recent 
years, on average, 90 per cent of tourists are from European countries.9 
 
The path of foreign direct investment has also been giving an increased contribution to 
external inflows to Cape Verde. In the last ten years, foreign direct investment has 
jumped from around 5 per cent of GDP to more than 11 per cent. Tourism has attracted 
the majority of these inflows, mainly on real estate and construction and broadly 
promoted by some EMU countries. Besides tourism-related investments, foreign 
investment originated from Europe has also been directed to communications, energy 
and financial institutions. The main Cape-verdean firms in those sectors are partly 
owned by corresponding Portuguese specialized firms, which bring in expertise and 
know-how. On average, in recent years, investment from Portugal, Spain and Italy 
represented together more than half of total foreign direct investment. 
 
Another quite relevant source of external inflows is emigrants’ remittances. In spite of 
its descending relative importance (resulting, among other factors, from the reduction in 
emigration flows, the decrease in altruism-motivated transfers and the end of fiscal 
                                                 
9
 World Tourism Organization, available at http://www.unwto.org/index.php, accessed in January 2009. 
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incentives), remittances still represent nearly 10 per cent of GDP.10 Roughly 80 per cent 
of the remittances are sent from EU countries. 
 
External aid has also been an important financing source for Cape Verde. In spite of the 
recent graduation by the United Nations as a middle income country, it is not expected 
that such flows will abruptly come to an end. In recent years external grants and loans 
represented around 10 per cent of GDP and, according to IMF projections, they will fall 
below 9 per cent of GDP only from 2013 onwards (IMF, 2009). 
 
Regarding the economic policy regime, since April 1998 the Cape-verdean economy 
has functioned under the umbrella of the ACC agreement. The ACC includes three main 
features: 1) a fixed exchange rate between the CVE and the euro; 2) a lending facility 
endorsed by the Portuguese Treasury; 3) the commitment by the Cape-verdean 
government to adopt the macroeconomic reference criteria established in the EU Treaty. 
 
The overall balance of the ACC is positive throughout. The agreement has worked, de 
facto, as a fixed exchange rate arrangement with no realignments occurring since its 
inception. The successful exchange rate stability was progressively achieved through a 
sounder external balance while the interest rates kept on converging downward. 
 
After the institution of the ACC, Cape Verde has gradually dismantled the restrictions 
on international capital mobility, in line with the requirements made by the IMF. Some 
restrictions, involving specific authorizations from the BCV are still in place. However, 
as the IMF (2008) notes, Cape Verde is currently close to a de facto situation of perfect 
capital mobility. 
 
With the gradual promotion of capital mobility, interest rate management revealed to be 
crucial to sustaining the peg with the euro. Yet, only in 2006 did the BCV reference 
interest rates become a central policy instrument. Prior to that, when risks of foreign 
reserve depletion were in place, upward movements were applied, instead, to the 
coefficient of bank reserves. Data from the BCV and the ECB show that market deposit 
                                                 

 As alternative sources of external financing emerged in recent years, the Cape-verdean authorities have 
abolished fiscal incentives to emigrants’ deposits.
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rates have now converged towards the euro levels. However, significant differentials 
still apply to the lending rates. The magnitude of the current interest rate spreads can be 
explained by a number of structural factors. On one hand, banks are subject to some 
abnormally high operational costs (e.g. telecommunications and a high rate of non-
remunerated legal reserves). On the other hand, financial competition is not sufficiently 
deep yet, although improvements have been recorded in recent years. 
 
The behaviour of the stock of official foreign reserves has been outstanding. By the time 
of the ACC inception, foreign reserves were no higher than 2 per cent of GDP (6.6 per 
cent of the monetary base) while, in mid 2008, they represented 35 per cent of the Cape-
verdean GDP (114 per cent of the monetary base). 
 
This undoubtedly successful evolution was not straightforward. In 1999 and 2000, and 
in spite of the commitment to disciplined fiscal policy, government deficits represented, 
respectively, 12.5 per cent and 19.5 per cent of the GDP. Loose fiscal policy, stemmed 
from - among other factors - political cycle pressures, transfer compensation for bad 
crop years and from financial transfers to public firms, especially to those providing 
basic services. Such high pressure on domestic demand, with strong negative impacts 
on the balance of payments, led Cape-verdean authorities to use the ACC lending 
facility for several times during that period. 
 
After 2001, and with the exception of the first half of 2003, the effort of fiscal 
consolidation became clear: current expenditure was permanently reduced, tax reforms 
were implemented and tax effectiveness enhanced. Aware of the pervasive effects of 
fiscal disruption, Cape-verdean authorities have anchored the government deficit below 
the Maastricht threshold of 3 per cent of the GDP. Likewise, Cape Verde has achieved 
an important reduction of total public debt, from 98 percent of GDP in 2001-04 to 76 
percent in 2007, thus converging to the EU reference value. 
 
The ACC lending facility has not been used since 2004. This very much reflects fiscal 
discipline, together with the above mentioned large foreign reserve inflows, mainly 
resulting from tourism revenue and foreign direct investment. 
 13 
 
In balance, the current exchange rate regime appears to be rather credible. Having 
remained fixed for the last ten years, the exchange rate exhibits alignment with the 
fundamentals and is, now, truly embedded in the behavior of economic agents. 
Evidence of credibility comes also from the parallel foreign exchange market, where the 
amounts involved are small and the rates very close to the official rate. Additionally, 
despite the convergence of the CVE interest rates with those of the euro, the stock of 
deposits from non-residents keeps increasing. Furthermore, the euro and the CVE are 
already interchangeably used in most of Cape Verde, especially in the islands with more 
visitors. 
 
The exchange rate stability has also delivered the intended price stability. Although 
Cape Verde was already displaying relatively low inflation rates in the past, the ACC 
has undoubtedly driven Cape Verde’s inflation rates closer to those of the EMU. This is 
shown in Table 2, where averages and standard deviations of the inflation rates are 
reported for the period 1999-2008. For comparison, the table also reports figures for the 
aggregate euro area and for each EU country. 
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Table 2. Average and standard deviation of inflation rates, 1999-2008 
Inflation rate (%) Inflation differential vs EMU 
(1)
 
(pp) Country 
Average Standard deviation 
Average 
(abs value) 
Standard 
deviation 
Cape Verde 2.03 2.69 0.17 2.76 
EMU (1) 2.20 0.56 - - 
EMU countries: 
Austria 
 
1.91 
 
0.74 
 
0.29 
 
0.29 
Belgium 2.26 1.00 0.06 0.59 
Cyprus  2.76 1.25 0.56 1.03 
Finland  1.82 1.17 0.38 0.93 
France  1.93 0.68 0.27 0.26 
Germany  1.71 0.65 0.49 0.34 
Greece 3.33 0.62 1.13 0.28 
Ireland 3.38 1.07 1.18 1.10 
Italy 2.43 0.53 0.23 0.28 
Luxembourg 2.88 0.98 0.68 0.66 
Malta  2.53 0.92 0.33 0.74 
Netherlands 2.42 1.19 0.22 1.21 
Portugal  2.94 0.71 0.74 0.74 
Slovakia 6.21 3.46 4.01 3.74 
Slovenia  5.53 2.37 3.33 2.39 
Spain 3.23 0.54 1.03 0.31 
Non-EMU countries: 
Denmark 
 
2.14 
 
0.77 
 
0.06 
 
0.63 
Estonia  4.65 2.54 2.45 2.15 
Latvia  5.77 4.42 3.57 4.05 
Lithuania  2.87 3.69 0.67 3.33 
Bulgaria  6.79 3.06 4.59 2.65 
Czech Republic 2.74 1.88 0.54 1.57 
Romania 20.41 15.99 18.21 16.28 
Hungary 6.75 2.41 4.55 2.64 
Poland 3.92 2.92 1.72 3.08 
Sweden 1.68 0.80 0.52 0.53 
United Kingdom 1.77 0.84 0.43 0.63 
Sources: - European countries: harmonized consumer price index, AMECO database, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ db_indicators/db_indicators8646_en.htm, accessed in 
January 2009; 
 - Cape Verde: consumer price index, International Financial Statistics of the IMF (accessed in 
January 2009). 
Note: (1) EMU comprises the 11 founding countries plus Greece. 
 
Table 2 shows that the average inflation rate in Cape Verde is very close to the one 
observed in the euro area. Smaller deviations relative to the EMU average occur only in 
Belgium (an EMU country) and in Denmark (a non-EMU country).11 Such nominal 
                                                 
11
 Sharing a common currency does not imply sharing a common inflation rate. Inflation rate differentials 
observed within the EMU are analyzed, among others, by Honohan and Lane (2003) and ECB (2005). 
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convergence prevented competitiveness depletion of the Cape-verdean economy. 
However, Cape-verdean inflation rates display substantial volatility. Higher standard 
deviations are only recorded by some non-EMU countries – mainly eastern European 
countries – and by the most recent EMU member, Slovakia. The inflation rate volatility 
in Cape Verde tends to be strongly associated with the effects of rainfall instability on 
crops and on the supply of primary goods. 
 
The description provided throughout this section makes clear that Cape Verde is indeed 
highly integrated with Europe and with the EMU, in particular. Moreover, nominal 
convergence with the EMU provides indirect evidence that monetary policy has been 
conducted alongside that of the ECB’s. So, what is still left to prove is how suitable the 
ECB policy is for the Cape-verdean economy. In this context, the next section provides 
evidence on the synchronization of cycles between Cape Verde and the EMU. 
 
3. Synchronization of business cycles 
 
In this section we assess the co-movement of the business cycle of Cape Verde and of 
each of the current 27 EU countries with regard to the EMU business cycle. The goal is 
to establish rankings of proximity between the business cycles of each of the countries 
under analysis and that of the EMU. Such rankings will provide a picture of the relative 
performance of Cape Verde during its conventional peg to the euro, thus signaling the 
adequacy of the ECB monetary policy for the Cape-verdean economy. 
 
Data are annual time series of real GDP, in national currencies. With some few 
exceptions, as detailed in Table A.1 in the Annex, the data source is AMECO and 
covers the period from 1980 to 2008. An explanation regarding data frequency is in 
order. Although higher frequency data would be more adequate for studying exchange 
rate and monetary policies, we have chosen to use annual time series. Our choice 
follows from the unavailability or unreliability of quarterly real GDP data for some 
countries in most of the sample period. This is a cost that researchers studying 
economies such as that of Cape Verde and those of most EU central and eastern 
countries must face for the time being. 
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We measure the business cycle by filtering the log of each real GDP time series with the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The smoothing parameter λ 
is set at 6.25, the value that mimics with annual data the results obtained with the HP 
filter on quarterly data (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Figure A.1 in the Annex shows the 
resulting output gaps for each country during the period 1999-2008, i.e., the period for 
which a single monetary policy has been carried out by the ECB for the EMU countries. 
Given our purposes, all the 28 charts in the figure include the EMU output gap.  
 
Regarding the identification of the business cycle, four notes are in order: 
(i) There are three popular approaches in the literature (see Artis, Marcellino and 
Proietti, 2004). They are: the deviation cycle, which measures the cycle as the deviation 
of the log of real GDP from its trend; the classical cycle, which studies the turning 
points (peaks and troughs) of the log of real GDP; and the growth cycle, which 
considers the difference between the growth rate of real GDP and its trend growth rate. 
The classical cycle approach, devised for monthly and quarterly data, is not feasible in 
our case. In fact, we are using annual data for a period characterised by a high trend 
growth and low volatility, with very few turning points. Out of the 290 growth rates in 
the sample (29 time-series with 10 data-points) only 9 are negative. Given that filtering 
is needed in both the deviation and growth cycle approaches, we have chosen to filter 
the level of real GDP rather than its growth rate, as the deviation cycle is by and large 
the most popular in the literature. 
(ii) An important feature of the deviation cycle approach is that, in addition to 
qualitative information on the cyclical state of the economy (peak, recession, trough, 
expansion), it quantifies the cyclical component of GDP at each point in time. 
(iii) We use a simple non-parametric filter, rather than alternative procedures requiring 
estimation (say, the unobservable components model or the production function 
approach). This is due to the scarcity of data, especially for some countries. Given its 
popularity, the use of the HP filter has also the advantage of enabling eventual 
comparison of results. 
(iv) As the HP filter is a high-pass filter that extracts cycles of duration not larger than 8 
years, it includes fluctuations at high frequencies, which could be filtered out with an 
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appropriate band-pass filter. However, high frequency oscillations are less of a problem 
in annual data. Moreover, band-pass filters typically involve losing data-points or using 
more complex approximations at larger sections of the beginning and end of the sample. 
In any case, as a robustness check, we close this section by presenting results obtained 
with an approximate band-pass filter. 
 
The output gaps for the individual countries and for the EMU are now used to compute 
a set of co-movement indicators between each business cycle and that of the euro area. 
 
As a first simple gauge of the co-movements, we use the linear correlation coefficient 
between the output gap of each country ( ig ) and the gap of the EMU ( EMUg ): 
( )( )
( ) ( )2)(2)(
)()(
)()(
),(),(
EMUtEMUt iti
EMUtEMUt iti
EMUi
EMUi
EMUi
gggg
gggg
gg
ggCovgg
−−
−−
==


σσ
ρ  
where ig  and EMUg  are the corresponding average output gaps for the sample period. In 
spite of its extreme simplicity, correlation coefficients have been extensively used in 
recent studies of business cycle synchronization, irrespectively of the approach used to 
measure the cycle – see De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) for a survey. 12  
 
Table 3 presents the contemporaneous linear correlation coefficients between each 
country’s output gap and the EMU gap for the whole euro period (1999-2008). The 
output gap of Cape Verde has a correlation of 72.2 percent with that of the euro area. 
This score puts the country roughly at the middle of the correlations’ ranking for all the 
28 countries. Within the EMU, there are 3 countries with lower correlations than Cape 
Verde (Slovakia, Greece and Ireland) and another (Slovenia) with the same correlation. 
Moreover, out of the 11 European non-EMU countries, only 2 display higher output gap 
                                                 
12
 Many studies compare correlations for different sample periods or look at rolling and non-
contemporaneous correlations. Given our purposes, we merely compute the correlations for the euro 
period (1999-2008). We choose not to look beyond contemporaneous correlations, as non-
contemporaneous correlations would only be relevant for assessing adequacy of a single monetary policy 
if the data had higher frequency. 
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correlations. Those are Denmark (which, like Cape Verde, has had a fixed exchange rate 
against the euro since 1999) and the UK.13  
 
The good position of Cape Verde in the correlations-based ranking of Table 3 is 
noteworthy, given that the standard deviation of Cape Verde’s output gap is one of the 
largest in the sample (which is apparent in figure A.1). Within the EMU, only Ireland 
and Luxembourg have a comparable degree of volatility, while among non-EMU 
members only the output gaps of Estonia and Latvia have higher standard deviations 
(Romania’s gap standard deviation is similar to Cape Verde’s). This suggests that the 
good ranking of Cape Verde derives from a high concordance of business cycles, rather 
than from a high similarity in the levels of the output gaps. 
 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that the high correlation between the output gap of Cape Verde and the EMU’s 
output gap in Table 3 is not a fortuitous result for the 1999-2008 period. In fact, when the sample period 
is successively extended backward to include additional years, the correlation coefficients show 
remarkable stability through 1993-2008. 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients with the EMU business cycle, 1999-2008 
Country Correlation coefficient Ranking 
Cape Verde 0.722 15 
EMU countries: 
Austria 0.860 11 
Belgium 0.894 8 
Cyprus  0.923 4 
Finland  0.947 2 
France  0.949 1 
Germany  0.941 3 
Greece 0.027 25 
Ireland 0.657 18 
Italy 0.891 9 
Luxembourg 0.908 7 
Malta  0.744 14 
Netherlands 0.921 5 
Portugal  0.921 5 
Slovakia -0.060 26 
Slovenia  0.722 15 
Spain 0.878 10 
Non-EMU countries: 
Denmark 0.856 12 
Estonia  0.246 23 
Latvia  0.484 22 
Lithuania  -0.363 27 
Bulgaria  0.506 21 
Czech Republic 0.603 19 
Romania -0.414 28 
Hungary 0.196 24 
Poland 0.588 20 
Sweden 0.711 17 
United Kingdom 0.761 13 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Given the above considerations, we now focus on specific features of the co-movement 
of business cycles. A number of indicators providing a deeper analysis of business cycle 
synchronization have been suggested in recent literature. A large part of these indicators 
have been used in the context of the classical cycle approach, which has recently been 
revived by Harding and Pagan (2002, 2003). Such measures use a binary variable for 
describing whether an economy is in a recession or in an expansion. Within this 
approach, popular measures include, inter alia, the concordance index and Pearson’s 
contingency index (see Artis, Krolzig and Toro, 2004). For this type of indicators, 
Harding and Pagan (2005, 2006) have recently suggested formal statistical tests. 
Following Harding and Pagan (2002), the classical cycle literature has also focused on 
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the similarity of cycles’ amplitude. In the case of these measures, the cyclical binary 
variable is used jointly with the original time series values (see e.g. Altavilla, 2004 and 
Camacho, Quirós and Saiz, 2007).  
 
Instead of mechanically using the indicators devised for the classical cycles approach, 
we follow the measures recently suggested by Mink, Jacobs and de Haan (2007) – 
henceforth MJH – for the specific context of deviation cycles. These measures take into 
account the value of the output gap at each point of time. 
 
The first measure indicates whether a given country and the EMU are on the same side 
of their cycles, i.e. if both have positive (negative) output gaps. We call it the phase 
similarity index. The second measure assesses how much the output gap of a given 
country deviates from the output gap of the EMU. We call it the deviation similarity 
index. 
 
The phase similarity index in period t is given by14 
( )
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where ( )tEMUg  denotes the reference business cycle (the EMU output gap) and ( )tig  is 
the output gap of country i. Index ( )tiEMUϕ  may either take on a value of -1 or 1. The 
average of ( )tiEMUϕ  over a period necessarily lies between -1 (null phase similarity) and 
1 (full phase similarity); the value 0 means that the number of years in which the output 
gap of country i had the same sign of that of the EMU has been the same as the number 
of years with opposite signs. By comparing the average of ( )tiEMUϕ  across countries, one 
can establish a ranking based on the phase similarity of business cycles. 
 
Table 4 presents the phase similarity of EU countries’ and Cape Verde’s output gap 
with the EMU output gap, measured as the average of the ( )tiEMUϕ  index for the period 
1999-2008. Cape Verde ranks quite well, holding the 7th position among the 28 
                                                 
14
 As noted by MJH, this indicator is analogous to a concordance index. 
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countries, with a record of 0.60. This is the net value of 80 percent of observations with 
equal signs in output gaps and 20 percent of observations with opposite signs. Among 
the current 16 countries of the EMU, 5 countries (Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) display less phase similarity with the EMU business cycle than 
Cape Verde does. Cape Verde has a degree of phase similarity at the same level of 6 
EMU countries, namely Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain. Within 
the group of the 11 EU countries still not in the EMU, only 1 (the Czech Republic) has a 
degree of phase similarity higher than that of Cape Verde. 
 
Table 4. Phase similarity with the EMU business cycle, 1999-2008 
Country Phase similarity Ranking 
Cape Verde 0.60 7 
EMU countries: 
Austria 0.80 2 
Belgium 0.60 7 
Cyprus  0.60 7 
Finland  0.60 7 
France  0.60 7 
Germany  0.80 2 
Greece 0.40 17 
Ireland 0.80 2 
Italy 1.00 1 
Luxembourg 0.80 2 
Malta  0.40 17 
Netherlands 0.20 23 
Portugal  0.60 7 
Slovakia 0.00 24 
Slovenia  0.40 17 
Spain 0.60 7 
Non-EMU countries: 
Denmark 0.60 7 
Estonia  0.40 17 
Latvia  0.60 7 
Lithuania  -0.20 28 
Bulgaria  0.40 17 
Czech Republic 0.80 2 
Romania 0.00 24 
Hungary 0.00 24 
Poland 0.00 24 
Sweden 0.60 7 
United Kingdom 0.40 17 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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In order to examine synchronization between business cycles one needs to go beyond 
phase similarity and also assess differences between amplitudes (in fact, ( )tiEMUϕ  is 
completely invariant to the amplitude of the business cycle). This is done using the 
deviation similarity index, which, for period t, is defined as 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) = −
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−=
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i tEMUti
tEMUti
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γ  
where n is the total number of countries in the sample (n = 28). The distance between 
countries’ i output gap and the reference gap is scaled by the mean distance in the 
sample.15 The minus sign implies that the higher the index, the higher is the similarity 
between the deviations of output from trend output. In case of complete similarity of 
deviations, the index takes on its maximum value and equals 0. Averaging ( )tiEMUγ  
across the sample period yields an indicator of deviation similarity between the output 
gap of country i and the EMU output gap during 1999-2008. One can then rank the 
countries according to this criterion. 
 
As Table 5 shows, Cape Verde ranks less favorably when the amplitude of the business 
cycle is also considered. This is a rather expected result, in view of the relatively large 
standard deviation of Cape Verde’s output gap. However, Cape Verde is far from the 
bottom of the ranking. Its output gap is more similar to the EMU’s output gap than the 
gaps of 2 EMU countries (Ireland and Slovakia) and of 4 non-EMU countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania). Furthermore, there are 4 other EU economies with an 
index of deviation similarity close to Cape Verde’s (Luxembourg and Greece in the 
EMU, and Poland and Hungary outside the EMU). The case of Greece is noteworthy, 
since this country performs rather worse than Cape Verde as regards phase similarity, as 
seen in Table 4. 
                                                 
15
 Note that our index ( )tiEMUγ  differs from the original MJH’s in two details. First, they consider in the 
denominator the sum of the absolute values of all countries’ output gaps, and not their deviation from the 
reference gap. Second, they compute the reference gap as the gap that minimizes the distance to all the 
individual gaps in their sample. Our version is justified on two grounds: (i) differently from MJH’s, here 
only a fraction of the countries considered is part of the reference region; (ii) we compute the reference 
cycle directly from aggregate EMU data. As MJH state, the denominator of their index is meant to 
prevent the measure from being affected by an overall change in cyclical activity in the region. In our 
case what is relevant is to prevent the measure from being affected by an overall change in the dispersion 
of all the business cycles around the EMU cycle. 
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Table 5. Deviation similarity with the EMU business cycle, 1999-2008 
Country Deviation similarity Ranking 
Cape Verde -1.38 22 
EMU countries: 
Austria -0.49 7 
Belgium -0.38 4 
Cyprus  -0.39 5 
Finland  -0.49 7 
France  -0.29 1 
Germany  -0.36 3 
Greece -1.11 18 
Ireland -1.42 24 
Italy -0.32 2 
Luxembourg -1.23 19 
Malta  -0.98 16 
Netherlands -0.67 12 
Portugal  -0.51 9 
Slovakia -1.41 23 
Slovenia  -0.64 10 
Spain -0.46 6 
Non-EMU countries: 
Denmark -0.70 13 
Estonia  -2.51 28 
Latvia  -2.22 27 
Lithuania  -2.05 26 
Bulgaria  -0.84 14 
Czech Republic -1.01 17 
Romania -1.98 25 
Hungary -1.30 21 
Poland -1.26 20 
Sweden -0.95 15 
United Kingdom -0.64 10 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
As a robustness check we have computed output gaps with the approximate Baxter and 
King (1999) band-pass filter, calibrated for the extraction of cycles with periodicities 
between 2 and 8 years. In order to circumvent the end-of-sample problem of this 
method, which in annual data implies the loss of the last 3 data points, we have 
followed the fairly standard practice of padding each time-series with 3-year-horizon 
forecasts from an estimated AR(1).16 
 
                                                 
The 29 output gaps obtained with the band-pass filter are quite close to those obtained with the HP 
filter. Codes and data are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6 summarizes the results, as well as the implied rankings (in parentheses), for the 
three indicators used in this section, namely the linear correlation coefficient, the phase 
and the deviation similarity indexes.  
 
Table 6. Correlation, phase and deviation similarity with the EMU business cycle, 
1999-2008 (band-pass gap) 
Country Correlation Phase 
similarity 
Deviation 
similarity 
 coefficient ranking index ranking index ranking 
Cape Verde 0.644 (18) 0.60 (3) -1.38 (22) 
EMU countries: 
Austria 0.829 (12) 0.40 (12) -0.46 (6) 
Belgium 0.885 (8) 0.60 (3) -0.32 (2) 
Cyprus  0.905 (5) 0.40 (12) -0.43 (5) 
Finland  0.934 (3) 0.40 (12) -0.48 (8) 
France  0.947 (2) 0.60 (3) -0.26 (1) 
Germany  0.956 (1) 0.60 (3) -0.35 (4) 
Greece -0.011 (26) 0.00 (24) -1.08 (17) 
Ireland 0.673 (16) 0.60 (3) -1.51 (23) 
Italy 0.892 (6) 1.00 (1) -0.33 (3) 
Luxembourg 0.877 (9) 0.80 (2) -1.09 (18) 
Malta  0.722 (14) 0.40 (12) -0.90 (15) 
Netherlands 0.906 (4) 0.20 (20) -0.57 (10) 
Portugal  0.888 (7) 0.60 (3) -0.50 (9) 
Slovakia 0.032 (25) 0.00 (24) -1.68 (24) 
Slovenia  0.649 (17) 0.20 (20) -0.72 (13) 
Spain 0.877 (9) 0.40 (12) -0.47 (7) 
Non-EMU 
countries: 
Denmark 0.873 (11) 0.60 (3) -0.60 (12) 
Estonia  0.275 (22) 0.40 (12) -2.52 (28) 
Latvia  0.381 (21) 0.60 (3) -2.24 (27) 
Lithuania  -0.333 (28) -0.40 (28) -2.07 (26) 
Bulgaria  0.249 (23) 0.40 (12) -1.10 (19) 
Czech Republic 0.563 (20) 0.60 (3) -1.24 (21) 
Romania -0.250 (27) -0.20 (27) -2.02 (25) 
Hungary 0.099 (24) 0.40 (12) -1.07 (16) 
Poland 0.575 (19) 0.00 (24) -1.23 (20) 
Sweden 0.708 (15) 0.20 (20) -0.78 (14) 
Unit. Kingdom 0.763 (13) 0.20 (20) -0.57 (10) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the country ranking for the corresponding indicator. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In general, the picture previously found with the HP filter seems to be robust. In fact, 
the relative performance of Cape Verde stands, regardless of the gap measures. The 
linear correlation between the output gaps of Cape Verde and EMU decreases slightly 
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with the band-pass filter, but since that happens with most countries, Cape Verde holds 
position 18 in the ranking.17 Among the EMU countries, 2 have smaller correlations 
(Greece’s turns out to be negative) while Slovenia displays a correlation coefficient 
equal to Cape Verde’s. In turn, Cape Verde has higher correlations than 8 non-EMU 
countries. While the value of the phase similarity index for Cape Verde does not 
change, the country holds now the 3rd position (rather than the 7th) in the 
corresponding ranking, as several countries display now lower indexes. Cape Verde has 
now a phase similarity index at the level of 5 EMU members and 3 non-EMU members. 
Its index is higher than those of 17 countries, 9 of them belonging to EMU. Finally, 
both the magnitude and the ranking position are maintained in what regards the index of 
deviation similarity. 
 
As argued elsewhere in the literature, it might be true that, in general, short run 
macroeconomic fluctuations of developing countries differ from their developed 
counterparts (Rand and Tarp, 2002) and, thus, a “one-size-fits-all” policy might not be 
appropriate. However, we have shown that such a general conclusion does not apply to 
the case of Cape Verde. Overall, our results suggest that the Cape-verdean business 
cycle is fairly close to the EMU business cycle and therefore an official euroization is 
not likely to create problems due to monetary policy inadequacy. In the period 1999-
2008 the output gap of Cape Verde has been more correlated with the EMU output gap 
than the output gaps of several EMU countries and almost all of the other EU members. 
Truly, this high correlation is more due to phase similarity than to similarity in the 
amplitude of the business cycle. Yet, even regarding deviation similarity, there are some 
EMU countries and several other EU countries that perform worse than Cape Verde.  
 
Both phase and amplitude of the business cycle matter for the adequacy of monetary 
policy (see, e.g. Camacho, Quirós and Saiz, 2007). In fact, a single monetary policy can 
not identically fit countries with different cyclical states, as it can not identically fit 
countries with different amplitudes in output gaps. Yet, one can argue that the cyclical 
state is the most important criterion in the case at hand. Phase similarity determines how 
                                                 

 Like with the HP-filter output gaps, the high correlation between the band-pass-filter output gap of 
Cape Verde and the EMU’s found for the 1999-2008 period still applies if we gradually increase the 
number of observations by including data back to 1993. 
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well changes in the ECB monetary policy stance match the cyclical needs of each 
individual country. In contrast, similar amplitudes of business cycles do not guarantee 
that a given change in the policy stance matches the needs of each individual country, as 
one may not take for granted that the monetary policy transmission is similar across 
countries. Actually, given industrial, banking and labour markets’ diversity, monetary 
transmission is very likely to be different and unstable in euro-zone newcomers (see 
Gros and Hefeker, 2007). Accordingly, there is a case for attaching higher relevance to 
the correlation and phase similarity results. 
 
4. Conclusions and final remarks 
 
This paper has empirically assessed the case for euroization recently put forth by the 
authorities of Cape Verde. Such a possibility has been raised after a decade of a 
successful conventional peg to the euro. The pegging has achieved its goals, namely 
fostering economic integration with Europe and maintaining a macroeconomic regime 
of nominal stability. Overall, our results indicate that there is a strong case for the 
euroization of Cape Verde. 
 
The analysis has been developed within the Alesina and Barro (2002) framework, which 
highlights three criteria for assessing how adequate is for a country to replace its 
currency by a foreign one. The net benefits are larger (i) the smaller and more open the 
economy is and the more it trades with the issuer of the currency to be adopted, (ii) the 
higher inflation rates are, and (iii) the larger the synchronization between the national 
business cycle and the cycle of the currency issuer is. 
 
The brief overview of the economy of Cape Verde in section 2 has shown, inter alia, 
that Cape Verde has performed well as regards price stability during the ten years of the 
peg to the euro. It has also shown that Cape Verde has maintained deep and increasing 
trade, investment and financial links with the EU and, in particular, with some countries 
of the EMU. In both respects Cape Verde ranks very well in comparison with several 
EU countries. Hence, Cape Verde is very likely to benefit from euroization as far as 
Alesina-Barro’s criteria (i) and (ii) are concerned. In the case of the inflation criterion, 
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the gains would not consist of disinflation but rather securing the nominal convergence 
effectively achieved during the pegging. 
 
In turn, in section 3 we have assessed the performance of Cape Verde as regards 
criterion (iii). Our results strongly suggest that the loss of monetary autonomy ensuing 
from the pegging of the CVE did not bring relevant costs, at least compared with many 
European countries. In fact, the business cycle of Cape Verde has been highly correlated 
with the EMU cycle. Cape Verde scored a degree of phase similarity – and, though to a 
lesser extent, deviation similarity – higher than some EU countries, both EMU and non-
EMU countries. Hence our conclusion that the achievement of the two goals set forth at 
the outset of the peg did not came at a relevant cost regarding macroeconomic 
stabilisation.  
 
Looking ahead and considering the goals recently stated by Cape-verdean authorities, 
our results suggest that there is a strong case for the official euroization of Cape Verde. 
Such a regime will strengthen the commitment to the two virtuous objectives of 1998, 
making any overturn of the achievements accomplished to date less likely. Moreover, 
that would be obtained at no significant costs, given the structural characteristics of the 
economy of Cape Verde, the nominal convergence already achieved, and that the 
changes in the stance of ECB’s monetary policy are very likely to fit the cyclical needs 
of Cape Verde. 
 
In the current stage of its economic evolution, euroization of Cape Verde would also be 
important for a number of additional reasons, such as the following: as the authorities 
intend to establish a full de jure capital account liberalization, euroization would render 
Cape Verde immune to speculative attacks; as euroization would eradicate any 
inflationary and exchange risks, the corresponding risk premia would dissipate and, 
country risk premium aside, the domestic interest rates would continue to converge to 
the EMU interest rates; with euroization, Cape Verde would forgo the current 
opportunity costs of having highly qualified human resources involved in monetary and 
exchange rate management tasks, an issue that might be relevant given the dimension of 
the country and its current development stage. 
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One argument that might be raised against euroization is that Cape Verde’s structural 
trade deficit may result in liquidity constraints if the inflows of emigrant remittances, 
international aid and foreign investment decelerate markedly. While this could be a 
problem, structural trade deficits can only be solved through a permanent increase in 
international competitiveness. In the case of Cape Verde, this is independent of the 
exchange rate regime; to overcome a structural trade deficit, exchange rate flexibility 
has no advantage over euroization. Under euroization, an extreme and highly persistent 
external deficit would lead to an increase in interest rates and, eventually, to a disruption 
of international credit. At the limit, the nation could only import – and consume – as 
much as it exported. Yet this is precisely the adjustment mechanism under devaluation, 
as the high pass-through would not increase exports and would not thus create any 
additional room for imports and consumption. 
 
Finally, there are some economic and institutional issues concerning euroization that we 
have deliberately omitted in this paper. One is the loss of a lender of last resort and the 
loss of seignorage. It should be noted, yet, that these issues are typically raised under 
the assumption of a unilateral use of a foreign currency. Our view is that a proper 
euroization of Cape Verde should not be unilateral. Instead, we devise some euroization 
agreement – possibly within the auspices of the recently agreed strategic partnership 
between the EU and Cape Verde18 – in which adequate solutions could guarantee the 
existence of a lender of last resort and of transfers compensating for the loss of 
seignorage.19 This leads us to the issue of the formal model for euroization. While 
crucial, this political economy problem is far beyond the scope of this paper. The EU 
has already dealt with this issue regarding small European states that are not part of the 
EU (Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City) and will very likely have to deal with 
similar cases in the future. A model for international euroization agreements is an 
extremely relevant issue that should be addressed in separate research. 
 
                                                 
18
 See the “Cap Vert – Communauté Européenne, Document de stratégie pays et Programme indicatif 
national pour la période 2008-2013”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cv_csp10_fr.pdf.  
19
 In practice, some seignorage revenues are already forgone as a result of the informal use of the euro.
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To conclude, it should be noted that the choice of the appropriate timing for euroization 
is also a relevant issue. Our analysis suggests that the time is ripe for the euroization of 
Cape Verde. However, given the current international financial crisis, it is advisable to 
wait for the turbulence to dissipate. Meanwhile, negotiations for an euroization 
agreement with the EU need not wait. 
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Annex 
 
Table A.1. Real GDP Data  
Country Main source Subsidiary source (period) Complete Time-series 
EMU AMECO  1980-2008 
Cape Verde IFS-IMF  1980-2008 
Austria AMECO  1980-2008 
Belgium AMECO  1980-2008 
Cyprus  AMECO IFS-IMF (1980-1990) 1980-2008 
Finland  AMECO  1980-2008 
France  AMECO  1980-2008 
Germany  AMECO  1980-2008 
Greece AMECO  1980-2008 
Ireland AMECO  1980-2008 
Italy AMECO  1980-2008 
Luxembourg AMECO  1980-2008 
Malta  AMECO IFS-IMF (1980-1990) 1980-2008 
Netherlands AMECO  1980-2008 
Portugal  AMECO  1980-2008 
Slovakia AMECO  1992-2008 
Slovenia  AMECO  1990-2008 
Spain AMECO  1980-2008 
Denmark AMECO  1980-2008 
Estonia  AMECO  1993-2008 
Latvia  AMECO  1990-2008 
Lithuania  AMECO  1990-2008 
Bulgaria  AMECO  1991-2008 
Czech Republic AMECO  1990-2008 
Romania AMECO  1990-2008 
Hungary AMECO IFS-IMF (1980-1990) 1980-2008 
Poland AMECO IFS-IMF (1980-1989) 1980-2008 
Sweden AMECO  1980-2008 
United Kingdom AMECO  1980-2008 
Notes: 1. AMECO: annual macro-economic database of the European Commission's Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8646_en.htm, accessed in 
January 2009. 
 2. IFS-IMF: International Financial Statistics (IMF), accessed in January 2009. 
 3. EMU: 12 countries definition. 
 4. Germany before 1991: West Germany growth rates. 
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Figure A.1. Ouput gaps, 1999-2008 
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Figure A.1. Ouput gaps, 1999-2008 (cont.) 
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Figure A.1. Ouput gaps, 1999-2008 (cont.) 
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